Extensive analyses of Marine Le Pen's media interventions as leader of the French Front National have revealed mostly rhetorical differences from her father's discourse. In particular, despite Marine Le Pen's professed openness toward women and their policy concerns, and despite her professed intention to transform the FN into party suitable for government, there has been little progress in these directions.
Introduction
The skyrocketing electoral support for the Front National (FN) Several systematic analyses have revealed mainly cosmetic differences in the speeches of the two leaders (e.g. Alduy & Wahnich 2015; Fourest & Venner, 2012) . For example, Marine Le Pen has professed more openness to various categories of voters previously shunned by the party leadership, such as women, and she has vowed to make the FN a governing party. In-depth discourse and policy analyses, however, have revealed that these promises have been mostly empty to date. The current FN policies toward women have not evolved substantially from the traditional FN line (Crépon, 2012; Alduy & Wahnich, 2015) ; and the party's policy positions still place it in the niche party category (Ivaldi, 2015) .
However, the evolution of the FN's visual discourse has been all but ignored. Visuals are processed automatically, and contain important social information (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006) . More importantly for a party's electoral strategy, the visual choices candidates make in their electoral posters send a signal about their party's claimed political status (Dumitrescu, 2010 (Dumitrescu, , 2009 . Specifically, previous research found that mainstream party candidates draw more attention to themselves and demand a personal vote; while candidates of niche parties put the party in front, and themselves more in the background (Dumitrescu 2010 (Dumitrescu , 2009 ). These visual strategies correlate with electoral success, suggesting that they are taken as credible signals by voters (Dumitrescu, 2010) . In other words, candidates can therefore use their visual campaign public interventions left no doubt that he considered their place to be at home raising their many kids, and not in the public realm (cf. Taguieff, 1996; Alduy & Wahnich 2015, p. 53) . There is a consensus among the experts that his daughter Marine however, has attempted to move the party away from these controversial positions.
Marine Le Pen signaled a change in discourse in one of the first speeches as the new head of the party, on May 1 st 2011. This speech extended a friendly hand to all the categories that had previously had a lower or no place at all among the Front National supporters: women, gays and non-Christians (Jews, Muslims, or non-believers). According to the new party line, being French was all that mattered, and this superseded any other personal characteristic. At the same time, this openness failed to generate policy changes (e.g. Dézé, 2012 , Fourest & Venner, 2012 Crépon, 2012 Crépon, , 2015 . For one, Crépon (2012) notes that the FN 2012 political program contained no specific provisions protecting or extending women's rights. Under the previous party doctrine, women were supposed to play mainly a family role, as mothers, and this role was not repudiated after 2011. Rather, judging from the interviews presented by Crépon (2012, chapter 5) with FN members, the FN has taken more women-friendly positions, simply because it has ceased to contest certain women rights that are by now already enshrined in the French public consciousness, such as the right to having an abortion. Thus, rather than a true move towards more mainstream politics with respect to the place of women in society, the FN under Marine Le
Pen simply relented on its contestation of some mainstream political values.
The "normalisation" of the party line, meaning the shift toward more mainstream politics, has been contested not just with regard to its view of women, but also with respect to other areas of politics. There has clearly been a shift in discourse and policy programs, away from cultural and nationalistic issues and more focused on economic and social issues (Ivaldi, 2015; Alduy & significantly higher policy weight to cultural issues (e.g. religion, immigration and security) and significantly less weight to economic and social issues than the typical mainstream party.
Moreover, looking at particular policies, Dézé (2012, pp.148-155) points out that the 2012 party program deviated little or not at all from the traditional FN positions: the party still rejected other mainstream parties, immigration policies, the European Union, globalization, and advocated a very strong state. As such, the party has maintained its niche party status despite the leadership change (Ivaldi, 2015, p. 167-8) .
A systematic analysis of Marine Le Pen's public interventions comes to the same conclusion: the differences between hers and her father's discourse are often rhetorical, to make the same traditional values more palatable for younger generations (Fourest & Venner, 2012) .
Thus, Alduy and Wahnich (2015, p. 54) note that while Marine le Pen does not talk as frequently as her father about abortion (implicitly acknowledging this right), she has never used expressions such as "equality between men and women" or "women's fight (cause des femmes). " Crépon, Dézé and Mayer (2015, p. 529) conclude that "the FN of Marine Le Pen is certainly not the one of Jean-Marie le Pen. But it is not substantially different either."
At the same time, political observers agree that unlike her father, Marine has often professed her desire to get the FN in government (Gaultier, 2015; Goldhammer, 2015 have looked at her words, no study to date has looked at the changing visual strategy of her party.
As images convey important social information (Grabe & Bucy, 2009) The next section discusses the best party strategies for rallying voters, and how these strategies are reflected in visual campaigns.
Mainstream vs. niche parties: Different optimal strategies
Previous studies suggest that mainstream parties and issue-based parties have different optimal electoral strategies (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2006; Ezrow, 2008) . According to Adams et al. (2006) , niche parties (extreme right parties included) benefit from advocating increased ideological purity, while mainstream parties (such as the Conservatives or Christian Democrats on the right) benefit from broadening their appeal to as many voters as possible. When parties follow an inappropriate strategy (either broadening their appeal, for niche parties; or narrowing it, for a mainstream party), they lose votes (Adams et al., 2006, p.524) . Ezrow (2008) presents additional evidence that extreme ideological parties gain more from following a niche policy strategy, in other words, from resisting any temptation of opening up to other voter groups.
One strategy to broaden voter support is to market candidates' personal qualities. At first sight, this strategy could fit any party type, but there are several reasons why mainstream parties are more likely to apply it. Since the optimal niche party strategy is to emphasize the party and its ideology over the candidates, a marketing strategy focused on the person of the local candidate is difficult to reconcile with such an emphasis (unless, of course, the candidate is in fact the party leader). Moreover, due to the French single-member-district, two-round-majority electoral system, candidates with a winning chance have a clear incentive to search for a personal vote (Shugard & Carrey, 1995) , especially as significant voter volatility leads to sizable numbers of marginal seats (Kreuzer & Stephan, 2003, p. 133) . There are several reasons why in practice candidates with a winning chance are seldom niche party candidates or political newcomers. On the one hand, the second round is often an affair contested by the two main mainstream parties on the left (the Socialists) and right (the Union for a Popular Movement until recently, now renamed as The Republicans); thus, the incentive for seeking a personal vote is generally particularly strong for candidates of these mainstream parties (Kreuzer, 2000) . On the other hand, when mainstream candidates are not the only ones contesting the second round, they are often joined by local notables, politicians who are deeply entrenched in politics, as there is a tradition of cumulating local and national offices (Elgie, 2005) .
In short, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons (grounded in the specific features of the French electoral system) as to why a strategy focused on promoting the personal qualities of the local candidates should be followed by mainstream and not by niche parties (assuming, of course, that parties want to follow the optimal strategies maximizing their electoral support).
The grammar of visual election messages
Previous research has shown that visual communication is a rich source of political information, especially with regard to politicians (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; see Dumitrescu, 2016 , for a review).
For example, individuals take cues about politicians' policy positions from the groups they observe in their election ads (Swigger, 2012 McCafferty, & Harris, 1986; Rosenberg, Kahn, & Tran, 1991; Hall, Goren, Chaiken, & Todorov, 2009 (Barrett & Barrington, 2005) and election posters (Dumitrescu, 2010) .
 Second, the close-up of a person in a picture indicates social closeness (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006) . The closer the picture is, the closer the person appears to the viewer.
Since we keep strangers at (least at) arm's length, we feel a more personal connection with those pictured in a close-up, than with those who are pictured from more far away (provided of course, that the context of the picture is positive).
 Third, an element's importance is judged also by its placement in the image (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006) . Elements placed more to the center and more to the top are given priority compared to those placed closer to the margins or lower.
Previous evidence suggests that the personal vote seeking strategy in France translates in specific visual communication choices that can be decoded with the rules described earlier.
Dumitrescu (2010) Marine Le Pen has claimed wanting to bring the FN in position to take the reins of government, but according to all evidence, she has made limited ideological changes to the program. As a result, the party is, by all accounts, still in the niche category, while, at the same time, being significantly more popular. Given the previous research on mainstream and niche parties' strategies, and on visual grammar, we are now able to develop our hypotheses with respect to our two research questions.
Hypotheses RQ 1: Do FN candidates use different visual promotion strategies in 2007 and 2012?
The main expectation is that FN candidates in 2012 present themselves more as candidates of a mainstream party. That is, we expect them to try to attract more personal votes, using a more candidate-focused visual style. More precisely: In both years, FN candidates' PFs consisted in a two-page document (one double-sided sheet). The general format was similar across years: the top cover was taken by the candidates' picture, and it was the only part of the PF that candidates could personalize. The reverse side was reserved for the party's ideological positions, and was identical for all the candidates.
In addition to displaying the candidate's picture, the cover contained additional information that was identical for all the candidates in a year. There are some interesting The Party logo, the tricolor flame was featured next to Front National. Thus, the cover format in 2007 was consistent with a niche party's visual strategy, as it contained both the party, and the leader's name, and a significant part of the visual space dedicated to the party's ideological program. In 2012, in addition to the candidate's picture, the PF cover contained: a slogan ("Pour une Assemblee vraiment Nationale!," i.e., "For a truly National Assembly"), the candidate's name, the party -"Rassemblement Bleu Marine, Front National" -and the party logo. Contrary to a niche party's visual strategy, there was no mention of ideological positions, and there was little space given to the party's leader, whose name was referred to indirectly through Rassemblement Bleu Marine.
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The data was provided by the CEVIPOF library, an organization that collects campaign documents from elections at all levels. Table 1 summarizes the sample of available PFs with respect to the entire population of FN candidates in the two elections.
2 Examples of the covers in each year are pictured in Figure 1 . 3 There were further differences between the back sides of the PFs in the two years. In 2007, the reverse-side text had three headlines. One headline, at the top, listed the key problems faced by France and the French. A second headline, immediately below it, was about the main parties on the left and right and their inability to fix these problems. A third headline, positioned centrally on the vertical axis, was about the party's main proposed measures to fix these problems. In 2012, the reverse side contained a picture of Marine Le Pen on the top left of the page. Next to the picture, there was a message from her headlined by the title "To take care of you, I need you!" On the bottom half side of the page, headlined by the title "We will do it!" and by Marine Le Pen's personal signature, there was a list of 12 proposals. The bottom of the document called "for the support for candidates of Rassemblement Bleu Marine, Front National on June 10." Front National had the largest font on the page, followed by Rassemblement Bleu Marine. The FN party sign, the tricolor flame, was featured on the bottom right corner. In short, the backside contained significantly stronger personal appeals in 2012 than in 2007.
[ Table 1 here]
The data availability is influenced by its collection mode by the CEVIPOF. In fact, the PFs arrived to the center from private citizens who decided to donate the documents sent to their home address. Thus, any gaps in the data are due to the lack of individual volunteers. These gaps were more pronounced in 2007 than in 2012. In 2007, only 22 legislative PFs were sent to the CEVIPOF; in 2012, there were 94. As can be seen, in both years, candidates whose PF was available at the CEVIPOF performed slightly poorer than those whose PF was not available. 4 The difference in mean electoral scores between those included and those not included is of about half a standard deviation of the total population of candidates. There is, however, no overall difference in terms of the gender distribution.
b. Visual analysis software and measures
The PF covers were analyzed using the open-source visual analysis software first used by Dumitrescu (2009 Dumitrescu ( , 2010 . 5 The analysis focused on the visual presentation of the candidate, as illustrated in Figure 1 for both years and both men and women.
[ Figure 1 here] 4 For both years the PFs come from several administrative departments, with most candidates in each year running in departments in Ile de France. In 2007, the sample covers 10 different departments in metropolitan France (out of 96). Nine candidates come from the Paris department (41% of the sample), and seventeen candidates (77% of the sample) ran their campaigns in the Ile-de-France region. In 2012, the sample covers 36 departments. The department with the most candidates in the sample is Paris (with 14 candidates, or about 15% of the sample). 48% of the sample of candidates (N=45) comes from the Ile-de-France region. This geographic distribution may explain why the electoral support for the candidates in the sample is below the national average. In 2012, FN candidates in Ile de France scored on average about 2 percent lower than the national average. However, there is no reason to suspect that this geographic distribution in the data base is determined by anything else than the simple distribution of volunteers who wanted (or knew) to send these materials to CEVIFOP, which is itself located in Paris. 5 The software is available for free by request. The software determines with pixel level accuracy the location and the size of various elements in a picture. The colored areas on each PF in Figure 1 represent the three elements analyzed with the software: the entire area taken by the candidate on the cover (in red), the area of their head (face and visible hair, in green) and the area of their face (in blue). Each of these elements is compared to the entire PF picture (delimited in Figure 1 by a pink line)
First and foremost, the software computes the areas of these elements in pixels squared.
To generate comparable measurements across PFs, these areas were transformed so that they all represent percentages. For example, a value of 0.4 on the "Entire Candidate Area" indicates that the candidate takes 40% of the cover. We also compute two ratio variables: the ratio of the candidate's face to the visible body ("Face over Body Area"), and the ratio of candidate's head to the body ("Head over Body Area"). A value of 0.2 on the "Face over Body Area" variable indicates that the face takes 20% of the entire candidate image. These ratio variables indicate how close the picture is, with larger ratios indicating greater closeness.
In addition to the two ratios described above, the variable "Close-Up" also measures how close the picture is. It captures the distance between the lowest point of the candidate's chin and the bottom of their entire image. This distance is divided by the height of the cover to produce comparable measures, and then it is subtracted from 1. The larger the value, the closer the candidate appears. A value of 1 indicates that the candidate's chin is the lowest body part visible on the cover.
The central position of the candidate on the cover is computed based on the position of their face. More specifically, the variable captures the distance between the center of gravity of the area taken by their face and the horizontal center of the cover. This distance is divided by the width of the PF cover to produce comparable measures, and then it is subtracted from 1. This variable runs theoretically from 0 (indicating that the face is situated precisely on the margin of the cover) to 1 (indicating that the face is precisely in the middle). Larger values on the "Center Face Position" variable indicate more closeness to the center.
The position of the candidate on the vertical axis of the cover is computed based on the distance in pixels between the bottom of the PF cover and the top coordinate of the candidate's face. The distance is divided by the height of the PF cover to obtain comparable data. The closer to 1 the "Top Face Position" variable is, the more to the top candidates are placed.
Results

RQ1.
We begin by examining the differences in candidates' visual presentation from 2007 to 2012. Figure 2 presents the mean measurements of the various presentation features in the two samples (with 95% confidence intervals). For each visual feature, it also presents the t-statistic for the difference between the two years. 6 The immediate conclusion of Figure 2 is that, based on the observed samples, there has been a complete shift in presentation style, as all the t-statistics of the difference between the mean values are significant and support hypotheses H1a through H1d.
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[ Figure 2 here] 6 The equality of sample variances assumption was tested for using the sdtest command in Stata 13. The results showed it to be violated for two variables: "Entire Candidate Area" and "Top Face Position." For these variables the t-tests account for unequal variances. To increase the confidence in these findings, we also ran a Wilcoxon-MannWhitney (WMW) test for each variable, to account for the potential non-normality of the data. All the tests pointed to a significant difference between the two year samples for all the variables and in the same direction as the t-tests. For space considerations, the results from the WMW tests are not reported, but are available by request. 
RQ2. We next look at how men and women candidates presented themselves in 2007 and
2012. We particularly expect that women candidates in 2012 visually promote their personal qualities more. We first consider the differences between the men and women candidates in 2007, then the same differences in 2012, and finally, we combine the two samples to simultaneously test for both gender and time variations.
[ Figure 3 here] Let us first look at Figure 3 which presents the comparison of the variables of interest by gender in 2007. As we can see from graphs and the t-statistics noted below each of them, we observe relatively little difference in the self-presentation of women and men candidates on this occasion. Only two differences stand out, and they both indicate that men portray themselves closer to voters. For men, the face takes about 34% of the visible body; for women, the corresponding percentage is about 24%. Another indicator of closeness, the "Close-Up" variable measuring the position of the chin with respect to the bottom of the candidate picture, points in the same direction. The value for men is about 22% less than the value for women, indicating that men candidates use closer pictures. Thus, men were nonetheless, on average, more likely to visually encourage a personal vote in 2007.
[ Figure 4 here]
The same variable comparisons in 2012 are presented in Figure 4 . This time we observe significant differences in candidates' presentation by gender. The visual behavior patterns are somewhat reversed when compared to 2007. Women are more likely than men to invite a personal vote according to three indicators. First, there is the size of their picture on the cover, which is about 8% larger than that of male candidates. Second, their average "Close-Up" value is about 15% lower than for male candidates, making them, therefore, appear closer to the viewer.
And third, the Head over Body Area is also about 24% larger than for male candidates. Two other indicators however, suggest that male candidates are more likely to focus the viewer's attention to themselves. The Face over Body Area is on average 10% larger for men; and men are on average more likely to picture themselves closer to the top than women (albeit by a very small margin). Thus, in 2012 both women and men invited a personal vote, albeit through the use of different visual strategies.
[ Table 2 here] years at the same time, we look at the multivariate regressions in Table 2 . At the bottom of each model we note which hypotheses were tested, and which were supported. Table 2 express the magnitude of the shift in men vs. women self-presentation strategy from 2007 to 2012. These interactions are significant and in the expected direction in four of six models, indicating that on these four indicators women have made a bigger step towards visual self-advancement.
We also find some support for the expected differences in men vs. women selfpresentation styles in 2012. Consistent with hypotheses H2e and H2f, women feature larger images of themselves and appear closer to viewers in 2012 than their male colleagues. However, as already glimpsed from the simple variable comparisons in Figure 4 , they do not outperform male politicians on all self-presentation features. They are as likely to place themselves in the middle of the cover as male candidates. They are also slightly lower on the cover. Thus, the evidence supports H2e and H2f, but not H2g and H2h.
The analysis to this point has indicated mostly support for our hypotheses, consistent with a shift in FN candidates' visual self-presentation strategies in 2012 toward a more personal, close candidate image, a shift more pronounced for women candidates. Our observations are nonetheless based on limited samples, which is why the next section performs several sensitivity analyses designed to establish the confidence we can have in these patters with respect to the entire candidate population.
Sensitivity analyses
Gallop and Weschle (2014) In this section of the paper we consider the possibility that our data is biased in a direction that favors our hypotheses. For each of our finding, we simulate several possible alternative distributions that go against these hypotheses, and note how the results change with the sample.
Below, we present this analysis by research question.
Sensitivity analysis for RQ1. We observed in our samples that candidates use more [ Table 3 here] Sensitivity analysis for RQ2. We found before that women FN candidates underwent a significant transformation in terms of self-promotion from 2007 to 2012. The differences were significant both when we just considered the women candidate population in the two elections, and when we compared women to men in each year.
But what if our samples underestimate or overestimate the amount of visual promotion in the population of men and women candidates? In this section we consider how the results change if the samples are biased against the original findings.
For each of the measures we observed differences between men and women candidates in 2007 and in 2012, we construct eight alternative samples. This takes the number of simulated distributions to 56. As in the sensitivity analyses above, these simulated distributions have their means shifted with respect to the original distribution to go against the original finding.
[ Table 4a here] Table 4a presents the results for the difference between men and women candidates in 2007 in the simulated data. In the observed data, men tend to visually place themselves closer to the viewer. This finding is moderately robust to sample specifications: the significance and sign of the difference is the same in 7 tests, the difference disappears in another 7 tests and the finding is reversed in 2 cases (if the data significantly overestimates males' presentation features).
[ Table 4b here] Table 4b presents the results for the difference between men and women candidates in 2012 using the simulated samples. In the observed data, women are more likely than men to visually promote themselves according to three indicators. In the simulated data, the sign and significance of the group difference stays the same in 7 alternative specifications; but the difference disappears in 9 other specifications, and the findings are reversed if the sample significantly overestimates women candidates' presentation features or significantly underestimates those of male candidates (in 8 cases). The least robust finding among the three indicators is the one for "Close-Up;" the other two indicators of Entire Candidate Area and Head over Body Area are quite robust to different sample specifications. In the observed data, men were more likely to promote themselves according to two other indicators, Face over Body Area and Top Face Position. In the simulated data, the gender differences disappear in 7 cases, get reversed in another 7 and only maintain the sign and significance in 2 cases.
[ Table 4c here] Table 4c The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=114). The t-tests for the "Entire Candidate Area" and "Top Face Position" account for the inequality of variances between the samples. The cell color indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed one, red if it goes against it, and no color for no group difference. **Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=20). The t-tests for the "Face over Body Area" take into account the inequality of variances between the samples. The cell color indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed one, red if it goes against it, and no color for no group difference. **Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=92). The cell color indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed one, red if it goes against it, and no color for no group difference. The t-tests for the "Top Face Position" take into account the inequality of variances between the samples. **Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) The entries represent absolute t-statistic values for the difference between groups (df=61). The cell color indicates the direction of the finding in the simulated data: green if it matches the original observed one, red if it goes against it, and no color for no group difference. **Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed), *p<0.10 (two-tailed) No difference Notes. **Indicates significance at p<0.05 (two-tailed). * Indicates significance at p<0.10 (two-tailed). The variables are coded so that larger values indicate a stronger candidate visual focus. The equality of sample variances was checked for each variable using the sdtest command in Stata 13. Sample variances were found to be different by candidate gender for the "Entire Candidate Area," "Face over Body Area" and "Top Face Position" variables, and the t-tests for these variables take into account the inequality of variances between the two samples. The equality of sample variances was checked for each variable using the sdtest command in Stata 13. Sample variances were found to be different by candidate gender for the "Top Face Position" variable, and the t-test for it takes into account the inequality of variances between the two samples.
